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Shin Imai 
INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE STATE 
 
Abstract: The right of indigenous self-determination is now accepted at 
both the national and international level, but the exercise of the right to 
self-determination does not connote any specific institutional arrangement. 
This chapter, from the forthcoming book, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford), 
describes a variety of arrangements in Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States. Indigenous people have the greatest political 
autonomy in the sovereignty/self-government model found in the United 
States and in the latest self government agreements from Canada. The self-
administration/self-management model provides for indigenous entities to 
deliver social services and educational services to their own communities. 
The co-management/joint management model provides for indigenous 
participation in the management of lands and resources. Finally, there are 
arrangements that provide for participation in public government. An 
example would be the guaranteed Maori seats in the legislature in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
The chances of success for these initiatives are increased by ensuring that 
community member participate in the design and delivery. A scheme 
imposed from above will likely run into problems. During the period of 
implementation it is important to address issues relating to the 
identification of the appropriate group, the accountability of the 
indigenous institution to its own members and the role of women. 
 
Keywords: Indigenous self-determination, self-administration, self- 
government, co-management, tribal government, Aboriginal, Maori, 
Indian, Inuit, Metis. 
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INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE STATE 
 
Shin Imai* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of my clients in the mid-eighties was a First Nation located in 
northern Canada. To get to the reserve, I had to take a two-hour flight 
from Toronto to a small town by jet, stay over night, and board a 
connecting flight on an eight-person prop the next morning. The reserve 
was located on an island in the middle of the wilderness. There were no 
roads or railways within hundreds of miles. When the plane landed I could 
see nothing but a carpet of scrub broken only by the small paved landing 
strip and a dusty road heading off to the village. An invisible line 
separated provincial Crown land, where the landing strip was located, 
from federal Crown land, where the Indian reserve was located. 
  The elders of the community were concerned about a growing 
alcohol problem among the youth. Their worries came to a head when a 
young man was found frozen to death in the woods after drinking. After 
hearing from the elders, the Chief and Council enacted a law banning 
liquor on the reserve. There was a straightforward way to enforce the 
prohibition and stem the flow of alcohol. The only entry into the reserve 
was by plane, so it would be easy to search the luggage of the passengers, 
as the plane was unloaded. The First Nation asked the police constable 
who was stationed in the community to search the luggage of all the 
passengers and confiscate all liquor. 
 There was a legal problem with this idea. Because the plane landed 
on provincial land, only provincial law applied. The police constable, who 
was appointed by the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, was 
told by his superiors that he could search people's personal belongings 
only if there were reasonable and probable grounds that a crime was being 
committed. Possessing liquor was legal on provincial land. Therefore, 
when the person got off the plane, there was no crime, and there were no 
                                                 
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. 
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grounds to perform a search. This meant that a search could only be 
conducted once the individual set foot on federal reserve land, where the 
possession of liquor was illegal. But there was a practical problem with 
this idea. There was no fence demarcating the boundary and there was no 
easy way to police the crossing of the invisible line between provincial 
and federal land.  
 The Chief was frustrated, and decided to appoint his own 
‘peacekeepers’ from the First Nation to search all the passengers as they 
unloaded their luggage off the plane. Most passengers co-operated with 
the peacekeepers, but during one of these searches a community member 
objected to the search. A scuffle followed, and liquor was found in the 
community member's bag. It was confiscated and destroyed by the 
peacekeepers. No other action was taken against the individual. The 
community member, however, was outraged and complained to a legal aid 
clinic located in the nearest town, which was an hour and half away by air. 
The clinic lawyer felt that the search was illegal, as the search occurred on 
provincial land. Therefore, in the eyes of the law, the peacekeepers were 
no more than private citizens who had no right to search the belongings of 
other private citizens. The lawyer helped the community member lay a 
criminal information against the two peacekeepers, and they were charged 
with assault.  
  A variety of ‘legal’ work-arounds were canvassed to address this 
problem. The most obvious solution was to make sure that the airstrip was 
located on federal reserve land. The province, however, refused to transfer 
the airstrip to the federal government, and the federal government would 
not consider paying for a new airstrip on its own land. Another proposal 
was for the Band to construct a huge fence around the airstrip and force 
individuals to pass through a gate. Poets and cartoonists would 
immediately see the comic potential of constructing such a fence in the 
middle of a wilderness, to circumvent a problem created by an invisible 
and meaningless boundary. Some government lawyers, alas, had less of a 
sense of humour, and actually suggested the fence as an appropriate 
solution. Unfortunately, or fortunately, neither the federal nor the 
provincial government would pay for such a fence. In the end, the matter 
was never resolved. The charges against the individual peacekeepers were 
quietly dropped. The federal- provincial boundary has not changed, and 
the challenge of enforcing the prohibition on liquor continues. 
  Aboriginal communities across Canada have similar stories, 
featuring laws that are appropriate for urban areas in the south, but are 
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imposed in ludicrous ways in the remote north. For example, Susan 
Drummond recounts a story of an Inuk youth who was tried by a judge in 
a city in the south for a violent crime. The judge's solution was to sentence 
the youth to return to his isolated northern community. The northern 
community was just as worried about the youth in their community and 
incarcerated him on his arrival. The southern judge ordered the youth 
released and threatened to have community members charged with 
kidnapping.1  
 In the two stories recounted above, the Criminal Code operated in 
a way that was counterproductive to community protection. In the first 
story, the Criminal Code helped protect the bootleggers by making 
prosecution and detection very difficult. In the second story, the 
mainstream justice system dealt with a problem youth in a southern 
community by moving him back to his isolated northern community. 
Exposing the northern community to potential problems protected the 
southern community. More serious, however, was the fact that the 
application of the Criminal Code in both cases disempowered the leaders 
of the community and placed the authority and responsibility for dealing 
with internal issues in the hands of non-Aboriginal people from the south. 
 I thought of these stories after reading Citizens Plus: Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Canadian State, by Canadian political scientist Alan 
Cairns.2 In this book, he criticizes Canada’s Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples3, which recommended that governments enter into 
negotiations with Aboriginal nations in order to increase the Aboriginal 
land base and to recognize lawmaking powers in their own communities. 
Cairns says that these agreements emphasize ‘nation to nation’ 
relationships, treaties and a third order of government for Aboriginal 
nations at the expense of fostering a ‘common sense of belonging’ through 
shared institutions with other Canadians. In the two communities 
described above, I wondered how it could be said that the application of 
the ‘shared’ Criminal Code fostered a ‘sense of belonging’ to Canada? 
From the point of view of the dominant, non-Aboriginal society, having 
                                                 
1  S Drummond, Incorporating the Familiar: Investigating Legal Sensibilities in 
Nunavik (Queen’s University Press, 1997). 
2  A Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (UBC 
Press, 2000) 51-2. 
3  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report (Supply and Services Canada, 
1996). (‘Royal Commission, Report’). One of the complaints made by Cairns is 
that the majority of the seven Commissioners were Aboriginal. 
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the same Criminal Code apply on and off reserve may have appeared to 
strengthen the connection to Canada. From the Aboriginal point of view, 
however, the ‘sense of belonging’ may not have been felt as a particularly 
positive experience and would likely have contributed to a further 
alienation from Canada. 
 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
A. THE NEED FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, Indigenous 
people have survived a very dark century when government policy was 
aimed at destroying their cultures and taking away their lands.  
 A low point was reached in Canada in 1969, when then Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau released the White Paper on Indian Policy. This 
initiative called for the legal termination of Indian status, dismantling of 
Indian reserves, repeal of the Indian Act, and amendment of the 
Constitution to eliminate federal jurisdiction over Indians. The White 
Paper referred to Indian claims to land as ‘so general and undefined that it 
is not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of [legal] 
remedy’.4 Trudeau apparently thought that he was doing nothing more 
than formally announcing what had already happened – the disappearance 
of the Indian. Much to his surprise, he was set back on his heels by the 
angry reaction of First Nations, and by court rulings recognizing 
Aboriginal title. His government had to do an about-face and institute a 
policy that addressed land claims and Aboriginal title. 
 Similar developments occurred in the other jurisdictions. In New 
Zealand, after years of hostility to Māori, the government enacted the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 that provided legislative recognition of the 
1840 Treaty and establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal, 
which incorporates both Māori and pakeha (non- Māori) personnel and 
procedures, has launched a series of hearings looking into land, resource 
                                                 
4  Quoted in P Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, 2001) 268. 
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and cultural rights of Māori.5 In Australia, a 1967 referendum approved 
changes to the Constitution that allowed the Commonwealth (federal) 
government to make laws with respect to Aboriginal people, and ensured 
that they would be taken into account for calculating state populations. In 
the 1970's the government began a policy favouring self-determination or 
self-management6, which has continued off and on since that time. The 
United States began the era of self-determination with President Richard 
Nixon’s speech in 1970, which opened the way for the Indian Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act in 1975. This Act provided 
a mechanism for transferring responsibility for federal programs to tribes.7 
These changes occurred partly because non-Indigenous 
governments realized that the era of assimilation had not worked. 
Indigenous people had survived massacres, European diseases, forced 
removal of their children and mass deportation out of their homelands. 
The ‘Indian problem’ had not disappeared: instead, the assimilation policy 
had exacerbated the problems and governments were left with the prospect 
of social and economic disaster in Indigenous communities. Indigenous 
people themselves impelled the change by joining the wave of 
consciousness that began in the Sixties. In 1966, in Australia, Vincent 
Lingiari led 200 fellow Aboriginal workers in the Wave Hill ‘Walk-Off’. 
What began as a protest for the same pay as non-Indigenous employees 
turned into a seven year strike for the return of Aboriginal lands.8 In the 
United States the Trail of Broken Treaties was a caravan that departed 
from the West Coast in 1972. It traveled to various reservations, gaining 
support, before finishing in Washington DC, where Indians occupied 
                                                 
5  J Hayward and NR Wheen (eds), The Waitangi Tribunal (Bridget Williams 
Books, 2004) 
6  C Gibson, ‘Cartographies of the Colonial/Capitalist State: A Geopolitics of 
Indigenous Self-determination in Australia’ (1999) 31 Antipode 45, 47. 
7  See G Nettheim, GD Meyers and D Craig, Indigenous Peoples and Governance 
Structures: A Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management Rights 
(Aboriginal Studies Press, 2002) 32; The Harvard Project on American Indian 
Economic Development, The State of the Native Nations (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 20-1 (‘The Harvard Project’). For a review of economic 
development in Canada, see C Beal, “Aboriginal Economic Development”  in G 
Bailey (ed), Indians in Contemporary Society (Smithsonian Institution, 2008) 
231. 
8  National Archives of Australia, Fact Sheet 24, at www.naa.gov.au/about-
us/publications/fact-sheets/fs224.aspx. 
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offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.9 In Canada, a Native Peoples 
Caravan traveled across the country in 1974 and they were confronted by 
riot police on the steps of Parliament in Ottawa.10 In 1975, Whina Cooper 
led Māori in the Land March under the slogan ‘not one more acre more of 
Māori Land’. The march began in the north part of the country and arrived 
in Wellington with 30,000 supporters.11 
 It is now clear that there are sound economic and social reasons 
for promoting self-determination. The Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development has conducted a series of studies beginning 
in 1987 culminating in the publication of The State of the Native Nations. 
They show that self-determination and economic prosperity are 
inextricably linked. They reveal that poverty levels dropped on United 
States reservations exercising self-government powers, at a greater rate 
than poverty levels dropped in the general population. The studies also 
found that with greater self-government, leaders are more accountable to 
the members of the community and that their decisions are more likely ‘in 
tune with the cultural values of the community’.12 Stephen Cornell, the co-
founder of the project, is forthright in his view: 
 
the U.S. record is clear: if central governments wish to 
perpetuate Indigenous poverty, its attendant ills and 
bitterness, and its high costs, the best way to do so is to 
undermine tribal sovereignty and self-determination. But if 
they want to overcome Indigenous poverty and all that 
goes with it, then they should support tribal sovereignty 
and self-determination, and they should invest in helping 
Indigenous peoples build the governing capacity to back up 
sovereign powers with effective governments of their own 
design.13 
                                                 
9  V Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of 
Independence (Delacorte Press, 1974). 
10  V Harper, Following the Red Path (Native Peoples’ Press, 1979). 
11  SC Bourassa and AL Strong, ‘Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori: The 
Role of Social Structure’ (2002) 75 Pacific Affairs 227, 237. 
12  The Harvard Project, above n 7, 70. For the website of the project, see 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied. 
13  S Cornell, Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, Self-Determination in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada the United States (Native Nations Institute for Leadership, 
2006) 28. 
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The social basis for a self-determination policy is also sound. Michael 
Chandler and his colleagues have conducted a series of interesting studies, 
trying to understand why some suicide rates on Indian reserves in British 
Columbia, Canada, were 800 times the national average, and on others, 
suicide was practically unknown. Their conclusions are remarkable. They 
find that suicide rates are lower in communities that have retained their 
own language. In addition, Bands have higher rates of youth suicide when 
they lack measures of self-government over areas such as health, 
education, child protection, policing, access to traditional lands, and the 
construction of facilities for preserving cultural artifacts and traditions.14 
Claire Charters, in her chapter, discusses the growing recognition 
of the self-determination rights of Indigenous peoples at the international 
level. The most recent is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People, Article 3, which recognizes the right to self-
determination: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.15 
 
B. WHAT IS SELF-DETERMINATION? 
A wide variety of terms are used to describe the general policy approach 
described in this chapter. A Māori commentator from Aotearoa/New 
Zealand says: 
 
Maori aspiration for greater control over their own 
destinies and resources is variously described as a search 
for sovereignty, autonomy, independence, self-governance, 
self-determination, tino rangatiratanga, and mana 
motuhake. There are important distinctions between those 
terms, though they all capture an underlying commitment 
to the advancement of Maori people as Maori, and the 
                                                 
14  D Hallett, MJ Chandler and CE Lalonde, ‘Aboriginal Language Knowledge and 
Youth Suicide’ (2007) 22 Cognitive Development 292, 292. The first study on 
cultural continuity was MJ Chandler and CE Lalonde, ‘Cultural Continuity as a 
Hedge Against Suicide in Canada's First Nations’ (1998) 35 Transcultural 
Psychiatry 191. 
15  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 
A/RES/61/295, UNGA, 61st Sess (Sept 13, 2007).  
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protection of the environment for future generations. And 
all reject any notion of an assimilated future. 16 
 
Agreement on terminology is rendered more difficult because Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous parties may formulate the problem in entirely 
different ways. Non-Indigenous governments and courts tend to analyze 
the issue in relation to relative powers and jurisdictions. What laws will 
Indigenous people be able to enact? Will Indigenous laws be subservient 
to federal laws? What institutions will be established to implement 
policies? Indigenous parties, on the other hand, tend to view the issues in 
terms of on-going resistance to the encroachment of non-Indigenous 
social, economic and political structures.17 Their approach to self-
government may be better understood as a ‘bundle of dynamic legal 
relationships, political aspirations and affirmations of cultural 
continuity’.18 
The difference in these approaches may be illustrated by 
comparing the Canadian government’s negotiation policy on self-
government, with the approach of Canadian Aboriginal academic John 
Borrows. The federal government policy recognizes that there is an 
inherent right of self- government and sets out what areas of jurisdiction 
are negotiable, whom the government will negotiate with, and how 
negotiated agreements are to be ratified. A major objective is to harmonize 
laws: ‘it is in the interest of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
governments to develop co-operative arrangements that will ensure the 
harmonious relationship of laws which is indispensable to the proper 
functioning of the federation’.19 Borrows, on the other hand, in ‘A 
Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-
government’, recounts his family history going back to the great Shawnee 
                                                 
16  M Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-determination 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 218. 
17  See F Barth, ‘Preface, 1998’ in F Barth (ed), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: 
The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Waveland Press, 1969, 1998) 7 
(‘... in analysing Indigenous people’s political activism, we discussed the shift to 
seeing such groups as engaged in a social struggle for meaningful change, not 
the revitalization of an unchanging heritage of aboriginal cultural traits’.). 
18  S Imai, Aboriginal Law Handbook (2nd edn, Carswell, 1999) 116. (‘Imai, 
Handbook’) 
19  See ‘The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent 
Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government’ (‘federal self-
government policy’), at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html. 
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leader, Tecumseh, who fought with the British against the Americans 
during the War of 1812. Borrows points out that Tecumseh fought as an 
ally to the British, not as a subject, with the objective of protecting Indian 
lands. Borrows talks about a great-great-grandmother who was a medicine 
woman and who kept alive the traditions of her people. He talks about 
other ancestors who converted to Christianity and signed treaties, and 
relates this history to the present-day actions of the Chippewas of the 
Nawash Band Council. Through all this, he shows how the Indigenous 
people asserted their autonomy in the face of huge pressures. Of his 
methodology, Borrows says  
 
the term ‘self-government’ does not require a legal or 
technical definition because I do not refer to self-
government as an abstract, futuristic institution. I identify 
self-government with particular events in which our people 
have exercised specific instances of control in their internal 
and external societal relationships.20 
 
Of course, the federal policy and the reflections by Borrows are not 
comparable because they were drafted for different purposes. But that is 
precisely the point. The parties may come to the negotiating table for very 
different purposes, making communication a challenge.  
The difference between the parties does not lie only in the different 
expectations of the process. The parties may also conceptualize 
‘difference’ itself in different ways. Non- Indigenous governments 
generally see this ‘difference’ as a set of static practices, some of which 
can continue today and others that are of no relevance in the contemporary 
world. Much of the current judicial thinking on ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ is 
also static and judgmental. It is based on the view that cultural practices 
and beliefs can be taken apart and catalogued into ‘integral’ and 
‘incidental’ value to the social group. For example, in the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision, R v Van der Peet, Lamer CJ thought that it was 
reasonable to ask Aboriginal groups to demonstrate that a pre-contact 
‘practice, tradition or custom was one of the things which made the culture 
of the society distinctive – that it was one of the things that truly made the 
                                                 
20  J Borrows, ‘A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-
government’ (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 291, 294. 
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society what it was’.21 He felt that it would be possible to do this while 
excluding those practices that ‘are true of every human society (e.g., 
eating to survive)’.22 This approach has been criticized by John Borrows 
for freezing Aboriginal societies in the past: 
 
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer has now told us what 
Aboriginal means. Aboriginal is retrospective. It is about 
what was, ‘once upon a time’, central to the survival of a 
community, not necessarily about what is central, 
significant and distinctive to the survival of these 
communities today. His test invites stories about the past.23 
 
The static view of culture arose at a time when societies were viewed 
hierarchically with some cultures being more advanced than others - some 
so low on the scale of human development that they deserved to be 
enslaved or exterminated. Modern anthropology no longer subscribes to 
those views. Culture is not a static group of attributes that can be placed in 
a hierarchical order, but rather a dynamic, ever changing complex of 
relationships. Commenting on the Van der Peet decision, anthropologist 
Michael Asch says: ‘culture is a system and a process rather than merely 
items and arrangements. It is inappropriate to attempt to ferret out whether 
a practice, custom or tradition is “distinctive”’.24  
This dynamic experience of culture may be why many Indigenous people 
are attracted to the concept of ‘self-determination’. It refers to the right of 
a people to decide how it wants to relate to a majoritarian population. As 
                                                 
21  [1996] 2 SCR 507, para 55.  
22  Ibid, para 56: ‘The court cannot look at those aspects of the aboriginal society 
that are true of every human society (eg, eating to survive), nor can it look at 
those aspects of the aboriginal society that are only incidental or occasional to 
that society; the court must look instead to the defining and central attributes of 
the aboriginal society in question’. Subsequent cases, including Sappier v The 
Queen [2006] 2 SCR 686, have backtracked a little from this position.  
23  J Borrows, ‘Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Trickster’ 22 American Indian Law Review 37, 43. A similar observation for the 
Inuit is made by Drummond, above n 1, 42 (‘Fixing Inuit culture at the period of 
the ethnographer’s fieldwork ignores the unceasing dynamism of groups that are 
constantly forming and reforming in the grip of the contingencies of time. Such 
ahistorical depictions prevent the Inuit from sharing the present with us’.). 
24  M Asch ‘The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and Van 
der Peet’ (2000) Review of Constitutional Studies 119, 129.  
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understood in international law, it does not say what form the association 
will take. Technically both the option of full sovereignty and the option of 
complete assimilation are open. ‘Self-determination’ refers to a choice, not 
a particular institutional relationship. It is dynamic and not fixed on 
particular arrangements. In the next section, I will discuss four possible 
outcomes from the exercise of self-determination: sovereignty and self- 
government; self- administration and self-management; co-management 
and joint management; and participation in public government. 
 
III. THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
Because self-determination is a choice, it can be exercised in different 
ways. The ‘sovereignty and self-government’ option leads to more 
autonomy for the Indigenous community to control its own social, 
economic and political development. The ‘self-management and self-
administration’ option leads to greater control of local affairs and the 
delivery of services within a larger settler government legislative 
framework. The ‘co-management and joint management’ model 
institutionalizes Indigenous participation in the management of lands and 
resources. The ‘participation in public government’ option provides a 
means to influence the policies of the settler governments through 
Indigenous-specific institutions. Within each category, there are a number 
of variations. These options are not mutually exclusive and in some 
jurisdictions, all four forms co-exist. 
A. SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 
 
In no jurisdiction does use of the term ‘sovereignty’ connote the existence 
of a separate international state. Rather, the sovereignty and self-
government models are characterized by the recognition of an inherent 
Indigenous authority to make laws over a defined territory. These 
Indigenous governments do not rely on delegated authority from settler 
government legislation. This does not mean that domestic courts recognize 
that Indigenous nations have plenary authority. In both the United States 
and Canada, courts and legislation have imposed limitations on the 
autonomy of these governments.  
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1. THE UNITED STATES 
Indian tribes in the United States have the most explicit recognition of 
their autonomy. Since 1821, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
described the tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’,25 and recognized 
their prior possessory rights to their territory. As one notable case 
explained: ‘[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, 
as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial’.26 This 
means that the tribes derive their authority independently of the 
Constitution of the United States, and only Acts of Congress can limit 
their authority. 
 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique 
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until 
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign 
powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.27 
 
The most significant Congressional incursion has been the Major Crimes 
Act,28 of 1885, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction over more than a 
dozen offences such as murder, kidnapping and rape. Other statutes that 
limit tribal authority include the Indian Civil Rights Act,29 which gives 
individual Indians recourse against their tribal governments for violation 
of their civil liberties; and Public Law 280,30 which transferred some 
federal authority to about sixteen states in 1953. Nonetheless, the ‘doctrine 
of retained sovereignty’ has survived. Therefore, in the absence of 
Congressional legislation, the tribes can enact their own laws and 
administer their own justice system. Today, tribal codes cover a wide 
                                                 
25  Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17-20 (1821). 
26  Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 559 (1832). 
27  US v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 322-23 (1978). 
28  Major Crimes Act, 18 USC s 1153. 
29  Indian Civil Rights Act 1968, 25 USC ss 1301. This statute is necessary because 
the sovereign status of tribal governments means that they do not derive their 
powers from the American constitution. Consequently, the Bill of Rights 
contained in the American constitution does not apply to tribal governments. 
30  Pub L 83-280, 67 Stat 588 (1953). 
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range of subject matter including criminal offences not covered by the 
Major Crimes Act, commercial relations, land use, marriage and child 
welfare.31 There are about 275 tribal courts in the United States and many 
tribes have courts of appeal.32 The extent to which tribal jurisdiction 
extends to non-Indians has been litigated several times in the Unites States 
Supreme Court. The current law, in a nutshell, is that in most cases the 
tribal jurisdictions do not apply to non-Indians.33 
FROM THE MID SEVENTIES ONWARD, CONGRESS PASSED A NUMBER OF LAWS 
THAT ENCOURAGED GREATER EXERCISE OF TRIBAL POWERS. THE MOST 
SIGNIFICANT, IN TERMS OF THE RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY, WAS 
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978. THIS ACT EXPLICITLY 
RECOGNIZES TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN RESIDING ON 
RESERVATIONS, AS WELL AS PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN LIVING OFF THE RESERVATION FROM 
STATE TO TRIBAL COURTS. IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO TRANSFER, THE 
STATUTE GIVES THE TRIBE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS.34  
 
2. CANADA 
 
Prior to 1982, the Canadian government and courts did not acknowledge 
that Indigenous peoples have inherent government powers. The only 
authority granted to Indians was through the Indian Act, which established 
elected Band Councils which could only enact by-laws on local matters. 
The other two Indigenous peoples in Canada, the Inuit and the Métis, 
                                                 
31  For a description of tribal jurisdiction see DH Getches, CF Wilkinson and RA 
Williams Jr, Cases and Materials on federal Indian Law (5th edn, West 
Publishing, 2005) 456-54; and The Harvard Project, above n 7, 37-51. 
32  These courts generally follow American adjudication processes but many are 
introducing traditional peacekeeper functions. See National Tribal Resource 
Centre, www.tribalresourcecenter.org/tribalcourts/history.asp; and the chapter in 
this reader by Christine Zuni Cruz. 
33  The leading case limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is 
Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978). For a recent case 
limiting civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, see Plains Commerce Bank v Long 
Family Land & Cattle Co, 554 US ___ (2008). 
34  Indian Child Welfare Act, 1978, 25 USCA, s 1911. 
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faired even worse as there was almost no formal recognition of their 
existence as collectivities. 
 In 1982, Canada amended its Constitution. Among other things, it 
added a provision recognizing rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada: 
 
s.35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed.  
 (2) In this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes 
the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.35 
 
Although no rights were specifically mentioned, the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, in its 1996 report, reasoned that a right of self-
government was already included in section 35(1).36  While the Supreme 
Court of Canada has yet to decide whether this is correct, it has held that 
assertion of a general right of self-government over reserve land is too 
broad; instead, self-government rights need to be proven on a specific, 
case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the Court has decided that, in cases 
involving Aboriginal title and treaty rights to fish, Aboriginal peoples have 
some decision-making authority.37  
  In the meantime, the federal government has committed itself to 
recognizing the existence of the inherent right to self-government. Based 
on the federal self-government policy, negotiations have continued on land 
claims and self- government. Over a dozen significant agreements have 
been signed since the mid seventies, as well as scores of minor settlements 
for land disputes. The land portions of these agreements range from 
                                                 
35  Constitution Act 1982, being Sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) s 35. 
36  See Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2 Pt 2, 245-65.  
37  Generally, see K McNeil, ‘Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since 
Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence’ in H Foster, H Raven and J Webber 
(eds), Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights (UBC Press, 2007) 129. In R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821 
the Court held that holding a bingo without a provincial license did not fall 
under a right of self-government, and left open the question of whether such a 
right could exist. Other cases have suggested that First Nations have authority 
over Aboriginal title land (Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 
1010), and treaty rights (Marshall v Canada [1999] 3 SCR 533), without 
specifically finding that a right of self-government existed. 
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136,000 square miles of land for the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic to 2.7 
square miles for Tsawwassen in British Columbia.38  
 While all of these agreements contain a self-government 
component, the Nisga’a Agreement of British Columbia is among those 
that go the furthest, by giving the self- government powers constitutional 
status. Because the rights contained in the Nisga’a Agreement are section 
35(1) ‘treaty rights’, ordinary legislation cannot derogate from them. They 
thus enjoy much greater protection than self-government rights in the 
United States, where Congress has plenary power to derogate from tribal 
authorities. However, the extent of Nisga’a jurisdiction is considerably 
more restricted than that of the Navajo in the United States, or even than 
that envisaged by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Nisga’a 
authority is paramount over some internal matters, including Nisga’a 
government and constitution,39 Nisga’a citizenship,40 culture and 
language,41 Nisga’a property,42 use of Nisga’a lands,43 child and family 
services,44 education,45 and cultural property.46 In other areas, the 
provincial or federal government laws are either paramount (eg, health 
services and intoxicants), or are exclusive (eg, criminal law). As for 
adjudication of disputes, the Agreement provides for the creation of a 
Nisga’a court if provincial approval is obtained,47 but any appeals must be 
taken to Supreme Court of British Columbia.48 Finally, the form of 
government does not look radically different from Indian Act’s Band 
Councils. 
 
                                                 
38  For a more detailed description of some of these agreements, see S Imai, 
‘Aboriginal Land Claims’ in Handbook of North American Indians, vol 2 
(Smithsonian Institution, 2008) 177-84. See also the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs (www.ainc-inac.gc.ca) and the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission (www.bctreaty.net).  
39  Nisga’a Final Agreement (Canada, British Columbia, Nisga’a Nation, 1998) ch 
11, s 34. 
40  Ibid, ch 11, s 39. 
41  Ibid, s 41. 
42  Ibid, s 44. 
43  Ibid, s 47. 
44  Ibid, s 89. 
45  Ibid, ss 100, 103. 
46  Ibid, s 115. 
47  Ibid, s 36. 
48  Ibid, ch 12, s 45. 
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3. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
 
The courts in Australia and New Zealand have traditionally not recognized 
any sovereignty for Indigenous people. In fact, in 1971 an Australian case, 
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty. Ltd.49 decided that, as a matter of law, Australia 
was terra nullius when the first settlers arrived. That is, the land was 
empty. Far from recognizing any rights to land or self-government, the 
Court found that the Aborigines did not even exist as people with rights. It 
was not until 1992, that the High Court in Mabo reversed this decision and 
recognized the existence of native title in Australia.50 In New Zealand, the 
existence of Māori sovereignty turns on the meaning of the 1840 Treaty of 
Waitangi. The Māori version of the treaty states that the Māori retained 
tino rangatiratanga over their taonga, which roughly translates to 
sovereignty over their treasures. The English version of the Treaty states 
that Māori ceded all of their sovereignty to the British Crown. While there 
was a period when the Treaty was completely ignored, courts and 
government have now begun to recognize some Māori interests in relation 
to land and resources.51 However, in neither country have courts 
recognized sovereignty in the way that courts in the United States have. As 
a consequence of the hostile judicial environment, in neither country have 
land settlements with Indigenous people resulted in the combination of 
land and jurisdiction that has characterized policy toward American tribes 
and recent Canadian land claims settlements. 
  Nonetheless, sovereignty is part of the political vocabulary of 
Australian Indigenous people and Māori. In Australia, in the late 1980’s 
during the debates on negotiating a modern treaty, some Aboriginal 
leaders suggested that Aboriginal Australians should seek full 
independence as a country.52 This idea does not appear to have gained 
much traction, but there is interest in looking for a new arrangement 
within Australia. Will Sanders argues that Indigenous people in Australia 
have jurisdiction to make their own laws and that they represent ‘a 
                                                 
49  Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd. (1971) 17 FLR 141. See also Coe v 
Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 403. 
50  Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1 (HC). See the chapter by 
Kent McNeil for a fuller discussion. 
51  See Bourassa and Strong, above n 11. 
52  N Pearson, ‘Reconciliation: To Be or Not To Be - A Separate Aboriginal 
Nationhood or Aboriginal Self-determination and Self-government Within the 
Australian Nation?’ [1993] Aboriginal Law Bulletin 12. 
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repressed third order within Australian government, alongside the State 
and Commonwealth orders’.53 Lisa Behrendt suggests that the aspiration 
of the treaty would be for ‘internal self-determination’ within the 
Australian state: 
 
[t]he rights enmeshed in the concept of ‘self-determination’ 
include, I would argue, everything from the right not to be 
discriminated against, to the rights to enjoy language, 
culture and heritage, our rights to land, seas, waters and 
natural resources, the right to be educated and to work, the 
right to be economically self sufficient, the right to be 
involved in decision-making processes that impact upon 
our lives and the right to govern and manage our own 
affairs and our communities.54   
  
Similarly, Andrea Tunks from Aotearoa/New Zealand states flatly, 
‘[s]ecession is not at the forefront of Māori aspirations’.55 She sees the 
Treaty of Waitangi as recognizing the existence of a parallel Māori law-
making authority: 
 
Minimally, it would enable hapu [tribes] and iwi [tribal 
confederations] to exercise law-making power in respect of 
their territories, resources and their own members. It may 
also include an ability for pan-tribal structures to gather 
separate tribal nations into one decision-making entity so 
that the relationship with Crown kawantanga 
[governmental authority] and non-Māori can be continually 
negotiated.56  
 
                                                 
53  W Sanders, ‘Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government: 
Rethinking Self-determination as Indigenous Affairs Policy’, Discussion Paper 
No 230/2002 (Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, University of 
New South Wales, 2002). 
54  L Behrendt, ‘Unfinished Journey - Indigenous Self Determination’ (2002) 58 
Arena Magazine 24, 27. 
55  A Tunks, ‘Pushing the Sovereign Boundaries in Aotearoa’ [1999] Indigenous 
Law Bulletin 69, text at fn 34. 
56  Ibid. 
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B. SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND SELF-MANAGEMENT 
 
In these arrangements the Indigenous community does not exercise 
inherent authority. They derive their powers from, and are limited by, 
settler government legislation and policies. The most advanced variation 
of this model includes a land base. These variations usually include 
powers for Indigenous institutions to make by-laws over local matters. 
Where there is no land base, there can be a transfer of a government 
program and attendant funding to an Indigenous organization. These self-
administration and self-management initiatives have brought significant 
benefits by way of control over funding and the potential for more 
appropriate service delivery. However, they have been criticized for being 
a poor replacement for true self-government or sovereignty.57 
 
1. SELF-ADMINISTRATION ON A LAND BASE 
The Indian Act regulates most Canadian Indians.58 This statute has the 
dual purpose of shielding Indians from the settlers, but also promoting 
eventual assimilation. It set aside reserves for Indian communities and 
shields the land from being sold off piecemeal, by requiring that 
communities consent to the ‘surrender’ of the land.59 The Act sets out 
rules for a wide variety of matters including membership, education, land 
use, wills and taxation. The Indian Act also gives the government almost 
complete control over the day-to-day functioning of the elected Band 
Council. For example, the government has imposed western style elections 
on Bands, thereby displacing traditional governance structures. Although 
the Act gives Band Councils authority to make by-laws, the subject matter 
is limited to local issues, such as consumption of alcohol and residence on 
the reserve. Even with this limited jurisdiction, the Minister of Indian 
                                                 
57  See eg, Cornell, above n 13, 10-11. 
58  Indian Act, 1876, RSC 1985, c I-5. 
59  The land set aside for Indian reserves in a fifty- year period beginning in the mid 
1800's was minuscule compared to American standards. All the reserves in 
Canada put together would have been less than one half of the size of the Navajo 
reserve alone. See Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2, Pt. 1, 422-23. 
Modern land claims agreements beginning in the mid-seventies, described 
above, have increased the total amount of land under the jurisdiction of 
Aboriginal people in Canada. 
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Affairs can disallow any Band Council by-law.60 At the present time, only 
a small minority of First Nations have succeeded in negotiating the self 
government arrangements discussed earlier in this chapter that have freed 
them from the Indian Act.  
Canada=s Métis are recognized as having self-administration 
powers only in the Province of Alberta where they have a similar type of 
arrangement to the Indian Act. The Métis Settlements Act established 
eight communities with governing bodies that can make local decisions.61  
The Indian Bands and the Métis Settlement Councils receive 
government funding to administer their reserves and settlements. They are 
also eligible to receive funds to deliver social services and economic 
development projects. In this, they are similar to American tribes who 
administer quite a range of federal programs through the Indian Self-
determination and Education Assistance Act.62 
In Australia, the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander) Act 200663 permits Aboriginal groups to create their own 
associations related to business, to land councils and town councils. Over 
three thousand entities have been created under this Act.64 The powers of 
these associations vary, depending on what State or federal statute 
provided them with jurisdiction, but in all cases, the authority to make 
laws is more limited than the authority delegated to Canadian Indian 
Bands.65 For example, in the Northern Territory, Land Councils under 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 are empowered to 
consult with landowners and negotiate land issues. The only regulatory 
powers they can exercise however, are, with the permission of the 
appropriate Minister, functions set out in the law of the Territorial 
government relating to (a) the protection of sacred sites; (b) access to 
Aboriginal land; and (c) schemes for the management of wildlife on 
                                                 
60  For a general description, see Imai, Handbook, above n 18, chs 8-10. 
61  C Bell, Alberta's Métis Settlement Legislation: An Overview of Ownership and 
Management of Settlement Lands (Canadian Plains Research Center, University 
of Regina, 1994). 
62  Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub L No 93-638, 88 
Stat 203 (1975). 
63  Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth); formerly 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth). 
64  T Anthony, ‘Aboriginal Self-determination after ATSIC: Reappropriation of the 
“Original Position”’ (2005) 14 Polemic 4, 6.  
65  See Nettheim, et al, above n 7, 237-317. 
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Aboriginal land.66 Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory can 
also carry out some local administrative functions if they are approved 
under the Local Government Act. Under this statute, a Council has power 
to make by-laws over a very limited number of local issues including 
alcohol consumption, the destruction of animals and issuing of licenses.67 
 
2. SELF-ADMINISTRATION OFF A LAND BASE 
Traditionally non-Indigenous people administered social services and 
economic development project in Indigenous communities. There are 
many horror stories from past years, ranging from the indiscriminate 
‘scooping’ of Indigenous children by over zealous child welfare agencies 
to the imposition of economic ‘development’ schemes that only benefited 
non-Indigenous developers. The decisions taken in the 1970´s and 1980´s 
to transfer the administration of these programs to Indigenous people 
themselves would appear to be a good thing. There are critiques, however, 
that programs designed by non- Indigenous people, will not be necessarily 
be appropriate or even feasible, in Indigenous communities.68 
An example that shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
self-administration model is the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Island 
Commission (ATSIC) of Australia. This organization was established in 
1990 in response to the demand for ‘self-determination’. It was composed 
of an eighteen member Board of Commissioners who were elected from 
35 Aboriginal Regional Councils. It was established to provide advice to 
the government on issues affecting Aboriginal people and to assist 
Aboriginal communities.69 At its height, it provided vigorous advocacy 
and brought Australian issues to international fora. On the domestic front, 
ATSIC was involved in the delivery of a variety of funding programs in 
the arts, Indigenous rights, housing, economic development and legal 
services.70 Although ATSIC played an impressive role in the Australian 
political landscape, there were problems with the design. Some critics said 
that ATSIC was too focused on addressing disadvantage of Aboriginal 
individuals, rather than pursuing self-government goals such as land 
                                                 
66  Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) s 23(2).  
67  Local Government Act 1994 (NT) ss 182-201. 
68  Imai, Handbook, above n 18, 182-83. 
69  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 7. 
70  The ATSIC web site is now closed, but some pages are archived at: 
pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/20060106-0000/ATSIC/default.html. 
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claims. Other critics noted that federal government control over the 
organization and its activities was very tight. The employees were not 
hired directly by ATSIC, but rather through the federal bureaucracy; for 
the first decade, the Chair was appointed by the government; and almost 
all of the programs were delivered under guidelines provided in Australian 
legislation. Consequently, in spite of the fact that the leadership of ATSIC 
was Aboriginal, the organization itself was criticized for being too ‘white’. 
In addition, there were internal challenges. The elected Board of 
Commissioners were said to be too involved in decision-making on 
funding, leading to charges of favouritism. As a consequence, in 2003, the 
service delivery functions were transferred to the Aboriginal and Torres 
Straight Islander Services. The political vulnerability of an Indigenous 
government structure based on delegated authority was illustrated when, in 
2005, a conservative Australian government shut down the organization 
and transferred the service delivery options to other institutions and 
government departments.71 
In spite of these critiques, in urban settings, self- administration 
may provide a valuable vehicle for Indigenous people. The urban 
populations are significant. In New Zealand, over 85 per cent of the Māori 
live in urban centres;72 in the United States about 67 per cent live off 
reservations and half in urban centres73; in Australia, about 30 per cent of 
Aborigines live in major urban areas74 and almost half live in urban areas 
in Canada.75 People living in non-Indigenous areas do not have an 
exclusive land base, and the communities are often fragmented, as 
individuals have different degrees of identification with their indigeneity.76 
Although there are calls for >self-determination for urban Indians=,77 such 
self-determination must result in arrangements that are different from 
                                                 
71  See Nettheim et al, above n 7, 379 -81. See general critiques by Anthony, above 
n 64.  
72  Durie, above n 16, 55. 
73  Harvard Project, above n 7, 321-66. 
74  From Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia, drawing on 
2001 statistics: www.hreoc.gov.au/Social_Justice/statistics/index.html#fn28, 
drawn from ABS stats. 
75  Statistics Canada: 
www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/abor/canada.
cfm#6.  
76  See Durie, above n 16, 95 (discussing alienation of urban Māori from traditional 
iwi). 
77  Harvard Project, above n 7, 359. 
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communities with a land base. Rather than beginning with an identifiable 
community and a geographical location, the project might build up from 
the services that are used by Indigenous people such as education, 
community centres, housing, employment training or child welfare. The 
institutions providing the services could facilitate participation by 
Indigenous people through reserving seats on the board of directors or 
establishing liaison or advisory committees. In addition, where numbers 
warrant, Indigenous people themselves could be funded to run some 
services. In the city of Toronto, Canada, where there is an Indigenous 
population of perhaps 60,000, there are many Indigenous-specific services 
run by Indigenous peoples, including two community centres, a co-
operative housing project, an elementary school, a legal aid clinic, a 
library, a health clinic, a men=s residence, a senior=s residence and a child 
welfare agency.78 In the best of these models, the Aboriginal people not 
only deliver the service, they also play important roles in the design and 
decision-making.  
It may be possible to go a step further by co-ordinating all of these 
services under an umbrella organization. This is the form of self-
government suggested by Canada=s Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, called ‘communities of interest’.79 In this model, Indigenous 
people would centralize the delivery of services and provide a structure for 
advocating for their members. It is similar to the Australian ATSIC model: 
an elected Indigenous body involved in service delivery and advocacy. To 
my knowledge, outside of Australia, no group has been able to implement 
this model for urban self-government. 
 
C. CO-MANAGEMENT AND JOINT MANAGEMENT   
 
The areas of land that are reserved or set aside for the exclusive use of 
Indigenous people is often not large enough to provide the support 
necessary for traditional ceremonial and sustenance activities, let alone for 
modern day economic pursuits that will provide an economic base for the 
communities. Indigenous peoples need access to, and control over, the 
land and resources, not only in their small exclusive use areas, but also in 
                                                 
78  Imai, above n 18, 187-88. 
79  Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 4, 519-622. 
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the larger land and resource base that they have traditionally accessed to 
survive.  
 It is difficult to measure whether or not there has been ‘progress’ 
on the lands issue over the years. Certainly, in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, the situation has improved, in that governments in all three 
jurisdictions have said that they are committed to addressing issues of land 
and resources. Kent McNeil’s chapter on land rights in this reader shows 
that there have been advances in recognizing title for Indigenous groups, 
including the recognition in both international law and domestic law, that 
governments must consult with Indigenous peoples before taking away 
Indigenous access to lands or resources. On the other hand, this is the area 
where Indigenous people encounter the greatest pressure to assimilate. 
Mining, gas and oil, forestry, agriculture, hydro-electric power generation, 
settlement: they can all combine to create a rationale for pursuing a ‘public 
good’ that results in the transfer of the ownership and management of 
lands from the Indigenous inhabitants to the settler governments. Physical 
confrontations over land continue in Canada, the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand, resulting in road blockades and land occupations.80 
 Gordon Christie is critical of the imposition of a dominant 
vocabulary on the issues: 
 
While pre-existing Aboriginal interests may be transformed 
into proprietary, or quasi-proprietary rights, Aboriginal 
sovereignty is removed from the scene at the point of the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty (replaced with, at most, the 
notion of ‘self-government’ - another construct within 
domestic Canadian law). The Crown is charged exclusively 
with the task of deciding how land is to be thought of, and 
how this translates into how land is used. Vital Aboriginal 
interest, those which exist today as ‘unsettled’ claims, are 
to be replaced with ‘rights’ and ‘title’, constructs 
essentially unrelated to these vital interests, and distanced 
from Aboriginal sovereignty. These constructs are 
grounded in non-Aboriginal visions - state visions - of 
interests Aboriginal nations might have in their lands, non-
                                                 
80  For a thoughtful report following the shooting death of an Aboriginal protester 
by the police, see Ontario Government, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry 
(Publications Ontario, 2007). 
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Aboriginal visions which are directed toward 
economic/exploitative ends.81 
 
The question then, is not only a question of law. In Canada, at least, some 
First Nations were better off not having any recognized rights in law, but 
having control and use of their resources in fact.  The coming of legal 
recognition has been accompanied by an invasion of their lands and an 
expropriation of their resources.  
 The obligation to ‘consult’ with Indigenous communities is 
certainly an improvement over the past, when no consultation was 
necessary. However, settler governments are loath to acknowledge that 
Indigenous ‘consent’ is required. This means that no matter how elaborate 
the consultation process, courts and governments do not recognize the 
community’s right to say ‘no’. Recently in Ontario, Canada, the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug were involved in a dispute in the bush 
hundreds of miles from any road, in an area accessible only by plane and 
skidoo. The First Nation objected to exploration activity on territory over 
which it still retained rights to hunt and fish. A court ordered the First 
Nation to participate in a ‘consultation’ with the company, Platinex. 
Throughout the consultation, the First Nation insisted that it intended to 
follow its own protocols before deciding whether to permit further 
exploration. After some months had passed, the judge decided that the 
First Nation’s right to be consulted had been fulfilled. When the First 
Nation continued to block exploration activity, the judge found that the 
Chief and the majority of the members of the elected council were guilty 
of contempt of court and he sentenced them to six months in jail.82 It was 
the longest sentence that people could remember for a contempt of court 
arising from protest actions.83 As for precedents, no examples come to 
mind of an entire mayor and council of a non-Aboriginal municipality 
                                                 
81  G Christie, ‘A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, 
Delgamuukw and Haida Nation’ (2005) 3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice 17, 46. 
82  Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2008] 2 CNLR 201 
(Ont Sup Ct).  
83  See Frontenac Ventures Corp v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation [2008] OJ 2651 
(Ont CA) para 63. In this case, the trial judge had imposed a sentence of six 
months and a fine of C$25,000 to former Chief for blocking a uranium mine on 
disputed land. The Ontario Court of Appeal found the sentence much too harsh 
and reduced it to a C$1000 fine. 
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being jailed over a dispute over land use. To exacerbate matters, Platinex 
was not an innocent, well-meaning resource company. Although the 
company had received a letter from the First Nation objecting to the 
exploration activity, in their public listing they said that the Band had 
verbally consented to the exploration.84 When the Band physically 
prevented the exploration activity, Platinex sued for over C$10 billion. 
That was about C$10 million for every man, woman and child on this 
isolated reserve.  
 A softer way for governments to access Indigenous lands is 
through co-management regimes. In the typical case, a commission or 
board is established with Indigenous and government appointees. The idea 
is that this type of structure will facilitate a collaborative relationship that 
embeds Indigenous participation. Canada uses co-management boards 
extensively and they are an important feature of all land claims 
agreements.85 The jurisdiction and composition of each board depends on 
the land claims agreement. An example is found in the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement.86 A number of wildlife management, resource 
management and environmental boards are established to provide Inuit 
with a formal role in making recommendations to government decision-
makers. These include the Nunavut Planning Commission, the Nunavut 
Water Board, the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board and the Surface 
Rights Tribunal. The Boards are generally composed of the same number 
of representatives from the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut as from the 
federal and territorial governments. Since Inuit will dominate the 
territorial government, the majority of the members of a Board may be 
Inuit people. For the most part, the decisions of the co-management bodies 
remain advisory opinions for a government Minister, who will make the 
final decision. Nonetheless, the Agreement makes it more difficult to 
                                                 
84  Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2006] 4 CNLR 152 
(Ont Sup Ct) paras 23-28. The trial judge’s decision was overturned after the 
leaders of the First Nation had spent over two months in jail: Platinex Inc v 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2008] OJ No 2650 (Ont CA). 
85  For a general discussion, see Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2 Pt 2, 
665-80. For American examples, see E Goodman, ‘Protecting Habitat for Off-
reservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a 
Reserved Right’ (2000) 30 Environmental Law 279. 
86  Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development and Tungavik, 1993) (‘Nunavut Land Claims Agreement’). 
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ignore the advice of the co-management board. The structured decision-
making in the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board is illustrative. The 
Board is the main instrument for wildlife management in the Nunavut 
Settlement Area and the main regulator of access to wildlife. The purpose 
of the Board is to create a system of harvesting rights and, priorities and 
privileges that reflect current and traditional Inuit harvesting. When the 
Board makes a decision, it is to convey the decision privately to the 
Minister. If the Minister decides to reject the advice of the Board, the 
Minister must give his or her decision in writing within 30 days and permit 
the Board to reconsider its decision. The Board will then reconsider the 
matter and make its decision publicly. At that point, the Minister is again 
in a position to accept the decision of the Board or reject the decision of 
the Board.87  
 In some cases, however, the Boards have more significant 
authority. The Nunavut Impact Review Board is the environmental 
assessment agency for the Nunavut Settlement Area. The Board examines 
the impact of project proposals on the land, air and water, and on the 
people of the Nunavut Settlement Area. They rely on traditional Inuit 
knowledge and recognized scientific methods to assess and monitor the 
environmental, cultural and socioeconomic impacts of proposals. The 
Board determines whether project proposals should proceed to 
development and, if so, under what conditions. If the Board decides that a 
development proposal needs to be reviewed, the Minister is required to 
refer the matter to a federal environmental assessment panel for 
socioeconomic and ecosystem impacts.88 
  In Australia, there have been extensive negotiations over joint 
management of parks. The individual arrangements vary, but they all have 
two elements in common: Indigenous participation on a board that 
manages the park, and lease payments to the local Indigenous community. 
A typical agreement relates to the Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park. The 
Anangu were granted title deeds to the park and they leased the land back 
to Parks Australia for 99 years. The lease agreement ‘encourages the 
maintenance of Anangu tradition through protection of sacred sites and 
other areas of significance’. The Anangu are to have a majority on the 
Board of Management, receive annual rental payments, and benefit from 
                                                 
87  Ibid, art 5. 
88  Ibid, art 12. 
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training and employment opportunities.89  A similar initiative exists in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, where there have been negotiations over three 
sacred mountains. Māori have been provided a role in the management of 
the mountains, although Jacinta Ruru feels it falls short of the type of co-
management that exists over some parks in Australia.90  
 The co-management or joint management arrangements can bring 
benefits to Indigenous people, but usually, the scope of their powers is so 
limited that they fall well short of recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction over 
their traditional lands. 
 
D. PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNMENT 
 
Two of the models that I have discussed so far, sovereignty and self-
government and self-administration, and self-management, involve the 
creation of institutions that are run by Indigenous people to serve 
Indigenous people. Self-determination could also take a direction that 
incorporates participation in the mainstream political system. There are 
three main variants to this model. 
 
1. GUARANTEED SEATS IN PARLIAMENT 
In 1867, New Zealand set aside four seats for Māori in the Parliament. 
Voters choose whether to be on the ‘Māori roll’ or on the general roll. 
Those who decide to be on the Māori roll vote for a representative in one 
of four Māori districts. In the 1996 elections, a partly Māori party, New 
Zealand First, took all the Māori seats. The Māori vote was diverse 
however, and there were fifteen members of Parliament representing a 
cross section of the political spectrum.91 Nonetheless, there have always 
                                                 
89  See Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts at 
www.environment.gov.au/parks/national-parks.html. Generally, see D Craig, 
‘Indigenous Joint Management of National Parks’ [1999] Australian Indigenous 
Law Reporter 46, at www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/1999/46.html. 
90  J Ruru, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership and Management of Mountains: The 
Aotearoa/New Zealand Experience’ (2004) 3 Indigenous Law Journal 111. For a 
weak version of co-management over other natural resources, see the iwi 
management plans under the Resource Management Act 1991, at 
www.rmalink.org.nz/view-subprocess.php?id=21. 
91  Durie, above n 16, 98-110. 
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been doubts about the extent to which the sitting members represented 
distinctly Māori i interests. This is because the mainstream political parties 
have ran candidates for the Māori seats so that the sitting members owed 
their first loyalty to the party, not to their constituents. The issue came to a 
head in 2004, when the Labour government enacted legislation that 
overturned a court decision and purported to extinguish Māori rights on 
the foreshore and seabed. The measures were strongly opposed by many 
Māori and there were marches against the legislation. The members sitting 
in the Māori seats were all members of the Labour party and they were 
told to vote with the government or face sanctions. One member decided 
to resign and went on to found the Māori Party. By the 2005 election, 
changes to the election laws resulted in seven Māori seats. The Māori 
Party took four of them, with the remaining three going to Labour.92 
 New Zealand is the only country with seats set aside for 
Indigenous voters. In Canada, the Electoral Reform Commission decided 
against this model and opted instead to recommend that electoral 
boundaries be adjusted to create ridings with higher concentrations of 
Aboriginal people.93 The federal government did not adopt this 
recommendation.  
 
2. PUBLIC GOVERNMENT 
In Canada’s North, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic succeeded in creating a 
new Territory called Nunavut. They have opted for a ‘public government’ 
model in which all residents of the territory, whether Inuit or not, may vote 
in territorial elections. Presently, the Inuit constitute a majority in this 
territory and therefore will have control. However, the government itself is 
structured as a territorial government exercising powers delegated by the 
federal government. This means that the Inuit will enjoy the full range of 
services and jurisdictions available to other territorial governments, but 
that they will also be bound by conventional institutional structures.94 
 The Inuit in Nunavut have protected their own rights in a separate 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement that establishes their ownership to land 
and ice as well as harvesting rights. I have already described the co-
                                                 
92  Elections New Zealand, at www.elections.org.nz. 
93  RA Milen (ed), Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada (Dundurn 
Press, 1991). 
94  Nunavut Act (1993) c 28. 
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management aspects of this agreement. What you have in the result, is a 
publicly elected territorial government that is largely Inuit, presiding over 
land that is partly under the mainstream regime and partly under a land 
claims agreement that preserves rights for Inuit. If the population balance 
shifts toward non-Inuit in the future, there may be danger of diluting the 
Inuit influence. On the other hand, this model may provide the means for 
an organic way to incorporate changing demographics. 
 
3. ELECTED INDIGENOUS PARLIAMENT 
The three Scandinavian countries have Parliaments for the Sami people. 
The Sami are Indigenous people who live in the northern parts of Finland, 
Sweden, Norway and Russia. They number 75,000-100,000. They have 
traditionally been associated with reindeer husbandry and it is still an 
important component for many Sami. The Parliaments were established 
first in Finland (1972), followed by Norway (1989) and Sweden (1993). 
Although they are called Parliaments, the number of elected members is 
small, consisting of 20-30 representatives. In Norway, the mainstream 
parties run candidates for the elections whereas in Sweden, there are 
Indigenous parties who put up candidates. These Parliaments do not have 
law-making power, but serve to advise government on issues of concern to 
Sami and have responsibility for some program funding.  
 The Scandinavian Parliaments have been criticized for being 
ineffective. In fact, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples flatly 
stated ‘[s]imply put, the Sami Parliaments lack clout’.95 The Royal 
Commission favoured the concept of a separate legislative body for 
Aboriginal peoples and recommended the establishment of a third 
chamber of Parliament called the House of First Peoples. Unlike the 
Scandinavian models, this chamber would have the ability to initiate 
legislation as well as providing ‘advice to the House of Commons and the 
Senate on legislation and constitutional matters relating to Aboriginal 
peoples.96 
 
                                                 
95  Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, 378. For an article on possible reforms, 
see AJ Semb, ‘Sami Self-determination in the Making?’ (2005) 11 Nations and 
Nationalism 531. 
96  See recommendations 2.3.51-2.3.54 in Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, 
Vol 2, Pt 1, 377-82. 
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IV. PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Up to this point, we have discussed self-determination mostly in the 
context of the relationship between an Indigenous community and the 
nation-state in which they live. We have looked at how the models differ, 
depending on the degree to which the Indigenous community can act 
independently of state legislation. In this section, I will touch on issues 
that are important internally for the Indigenous community itself: the 
process for implementation; what constitutes the community; what 
accountability mechanisms will control the Indigenous authority; and the 
importance of addressing the interests of women. The settler governments 
have a role in ensuring a smooth transition toward the exercise of greater 
self-determination in all these areas, but must act in a way that respects the 
autonomy of the community. 
 
A. COMMUNITY-BASED PROCESS 
 
One thing that must be clear from earlier chapters of this reader is that 
imposed solutions concocted by non- Indigenous social engineers will not 
work. Even the most well-meaning individuals can trigger disastrous 
social consequences. The only sensible process is one that involves the 
Indigenous community in the conceptualization, design and execution of 
the initiative. It is important for the community to be given the space and 
time to identify its needs, its priorities and the way in which it wishes to 
proceed. The proposals put forward by the community may not fit neatly 
into the bureaucratic boxes created by government departments. But that is 
the challenge that progressive governments must take up.97 
 When I worked for the Ministry of the Attorney General, we 
funded a community justice initiative on an Indian reserve. Some months 
into the project, the reserve justice committee heard from teachers that 
children from a particular family were arriving hungry at school. Rather 
than sanctioning the parents or apprehending the children, the justice 
committee decided to run a bingo to raise money for a lunch program for 
all of the children in this school. This caused some consternation within 
the Ministry because it appeared that the justice project had become 
                                                 
97  Imai, Handbook, above n 18, 181-85. 
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involved in areas that should perhaps be in the domain of the Ministry of 
Family Services or the Ministry of Education. Some bureaucrats wondered 
whether the Ministry of the Attorney General should continue funding the 
program. This may seem like a trivial issue but it is real, as anyone who 
has worked in government can attest, and the internal bureaucratic 
dynamics can have devastating impacts on projects on the ground. 
 For lawyers, especially, the importance of understanding a 
community-based approach is crucial. Law students are generally given 
the impression that law is a system of rules and the role of lawyers is to 
apply those rules with as much precision as possible. The focus is on the 
rule and what courts or legislatures have said about the rule. But in 
working with Indigenous communities, the rule-based focus can lead to 
bizarre results, such as the fight over the provincial-federal boundary in 
the story that opened this chapter. In the community lawyering approach, 
the focus is on how law interacts with the community as a whole. 
Christina Zuni Cruz makes the connection between community lawyering 
and self-determination in her work with the Isleta Pueblo:  
 
Successful community lawyering has just as much to do 
with process as it does with outcome, and when one values 
community, process becomes critical. Process is critical 
because for native peoples, community lawyering is about 
self-determination, both for the community and the 
individual, about recognizing traditional norms and 
practices, and about valuing relationships.98 
 
 
B. WHO IS THE ‘COMMUNITY’ OR THE ‘NATION’? 
 
Forced migration, urbanization and internal social dynamics have 
splintered Indigenous communities in many ways so that today, many do 
not conform to historical or ‘traditional’ groupings. For government, it is 
sometimes difficult to know who represents what constituency. For 
                                                 
98  C Zuni Cruz, ‘[On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous 
Communities’ (1999) 5 Clinical Law Review 557, 563. See also S Imai, ‘A 
Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-based 
Lawyering’ (2002) 9 Clinical Law Review 195. 
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communities there is a danger that a purported ‘leader’ may not be 
mandated to speak for that community. 
 The New Zealand Law Commission has addressed this issue in its 
report, Waka Umanga: A Proposed Law for Maori Governance.99 The two 
main political units among Māori are the hapu (tribe) and iwi (tribal 
confederation), but there are also many urban Māori who do not identify 
with any particular iwi. The law has recognized that Māori collectivities 
have interests in communal assets, but the legal or social personality of the 
group holding those assets is not clear. Māori collectivities had been using 
a variety of existing vehicles, such as corporations and trusts, in order to 
interact with the mainstream legal system but these vehicles were an 
awkward fit. In order to provide more certainty in this area, both for the 
government and for the Māori themselves, the Commission recommended 
creating a special corporate vehicle called the waka umanga, which would 
have some of the characteristics of a corporation but which would leave 
most of the internal arrangements to a charter developed by the Māori 
collectivity. It is interesting to see the approach the Law Commission has 
taken to determine how the waka umanga would be established. They 
regarded the hapu as the basic unit and suggested that there should be at 
least fifty members for the group to be viable.  
 
... A viable hapu being one that can respectably manage 
customary requirements in welcoming, feeding and bedding 
other tribal groups. That probably requires an active and 
local membership of at least 50, as nowadays all are not 
available for every event. 100 
 
The Law Commission recommended that fifteen people could propose or 
oppose the creation of a waka umanga and that disputes can be taken to 
the Māori Land Court, which has expertise on Māori issues. Initially, those 
that get together to make or oppose the waka umanga determine the 
membership of the group. Outside of the requirement for the minimum 
size of a hapu, there are no imposed criteria. The Law Commission stated 
                                                 
99  New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC), Waka Umanga: A Proposed Law for 
Maori Governance Entities, Report 92 (NZLC, May 2006) at 
www.lawcom.govt.nz. 
100  Ibid, para 7.65. 
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that ‘it is the right of a tribe to determine its own membership and 
membership rules’.101  
 The Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also 
turned its mind to the process for the creation of nations that would have a 
land base and self-governing jurisdiction. In order to move toward a model 
that was closer to the American situation, Canada’s six hundred or so 
Bands created under the Indian Act would need to be reconstituted as 
larger nations based on traditional affiliations numbering 50-80.102 These 
larger nations would hold the inherent right to self-government. The 
Commission suggested that a charter group, a group of Bands currently 
recognized under the Indian Act, for example, would hold a referendum to 
determine whether to proceed toward self-government. This group would 
then develop a constitution and membership criteria that were inclusive of 
those historically excluded by the membership criteria of the Indian Act. 
Membership would not depend on blood quantum. It is contemplated that 
there would be wide consultation with the larger membership. In order to 
be recognized the constitution and membership criteria would be presented 
to a Recognition Panel, composed of a majority of Aboriginal people.103 
 The flexibility suggested by the New Zealand and Canadian reports 
is important. Stephen Cornell says: 
 
the best way to avoid the one-size-fits-all recipe for failure 
is to let Indigenous peoples decide for themselves who the 
appropriate self in self-governance is and how self-
governing institutions should be structured—and to accept 
the variety of relationships and governance solutions that 
will surely result. This is what self-determination means. 
Furthermore, not only is outsider decision-making in this 
regard the antithesis of self-determination, but neither 
collective units nor governing institutions that are imposed 
by outside authorities are likely to command the respect or 
allegiance of the peoples on whom they are imposed—
which means they will not work.104 
 
                                                 
101  Ibid, para 4.50. 
102  Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2, Pt 2, 181. 
103  Ibid, 314-20.  
104  Cornell, above n 13, 27. 
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C. ACCOUNTABILITY OF INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT AND THE 
ROLE OF COURTS     
 
There is some controversy on how to ensure that an Indigenous governing 
body should be made accountable to its own citizens and how it should 
adhere to human rights standards. Some Indigenous leaders have 
expressed concern that merely applying civil liberties law from the 
common law systems would import a set of criteria based on western 
individualistic values that are incompatible with Indigenous forms of 
organization.105 For example, the importance of collectivity and communal 
ownership of land for Indigenous people would be different from the 
concepts of private property enshrined in the American Bill of Rights. It 
has been noted earlier that United States Congress enacted the ‘Indian Bill 
of Rights’ in the Indian Civil Rights Act because the Bill of Rights in the 
American constitution did not apply to the tribes. The enactment of this 
statute was not universally welcome. Domingo Montoya, a Pueblo leader, 
wanted to be exempt from its application, saying ‘[o]ur deep concern over 
the Indian Bill of Rights stems from our fear that it will destroy the 
traditions - and in doing so greatly weaken our governments’.106 
Nonetheless, in every jurisdiction, there are imposed limits on Indigenous 
governments. Every self government agreement in Canada states that the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to that Aboriginal government, 
although there are provisions for ensuring that the impact is softened 
where the application of individual rights would derogate from Aboriginal 
or treaty rights.107 
                                                 
105  ME Turpel, ‘Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive 
Monopolies, Cultural Differences’ (1989-90) 6 Canadian Human Rights Year 
Book 3. For a discussion of the impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act, see K 
McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Governments and the Charter: Lessons from the United 
States’ (2002) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 73. 
106   Quoted in J Wunder, Retained by the People (Oxford University Press, 
1994) 149.   
107   Constitution Act 1982, s 25 reads, in part: ‘[t]he guarantee in this Charter of 
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
from any aboriginal treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada…’. 
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 The courts will have an important role to play in the application of 
individual rights standards to Indigenous governments. In this task, the 
courts should be sensitive to balancing the interests of individual 
Indigenous citizens against the importance of the integrity of the 
Indigenous government and the reality of the context of Indigenous 
communities. The courts in the United States used the Indian Bill of 
Rights to make very interventionist decisions in the first five years after its 
enactment, but have since pulled back to give greater rein to Indigenous 
sovereignty.108 Undoubtedly, the task of resolving disputes within an 
Indigenous community can be challenging for judges. While a mechanical 
application of rules established in the common law would yield some sort 
of a result, it might not be a result that would be appropriate for the 
community. In Canada, Federal Court judges have been developing 
jurisprudence on disputes arising from customary selection of Indian Band 
leaders. The codes for these elections are created by the Bands themselves 
and the procedures for their adoption are often contentious, as disputes 
arise around decision-making ‘traditions’ or ‘customs’. The judges have 
adapted some general administrative law principles, such as bias and 
procedural fairness, taking into account the small size of the communities. 
For example, the strict application of ‘conflict of interest’ does not make 
sense when there are so many people related to each other.109 
  
D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN 
 
Gender relations in Indigenous communities have been greatly influenced 
by gender relations in the larger settler communities. Consequently, during 
the time when white women had few rights, the same regime was 
enforced, directly or indirectly in Indigenous communities. In Canada, for 
example, the Indian Act reflected patriarchal attitudes of the nineteenth 
century when women lost much of their independence on marriage. White 
women who married Indian men became Indians. On the other hand, 
Indian women who married white men, lost their status as Indians. When 
women in the settler society began asserting equality rights in the sixties 
                                                 
108   Wunder, above n 106, 148-56.  
109  For summaries of court cases on custom elections, see the annotations to s 2(1) 
‘council of the band’ in the annual volumes of S Imai, Annotated Indian Act and 
Aboriginal Constitutional Provisions (Carswell, 2009). 
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and seventies, the same occurred in Indigenous communities. Canadian 
Indian women waged a successful campaign to repeal the offending 
provisions of the Indian Act in 1985.110 
 The right of women to membership is controversial because it can 
run up against the very self-determination right that is being advocated 
here. The issue is illustrated in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v 
Martinez.111 The Pueblo tribal law set out that the children of a woman 
who married out of the tribe lost their tribal membership. In this case, a 
Pueblo woman married a Navajo man and the family continued to live on 
the reserve. The mother and a child challenged the law as discriminatory 
under the Indian Civil Rights Act because the children of men who 
married out of the tribe retained Pueblo membership. The US Supreme 
Court held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to deal with claims under 
this statute because, imprisonment aside, enforcement of the statute was a 
tribal matter. Author John Wunder hails this decision as an affirmation of 
tribal sovereignty.112 Others see this as toleration of sexism within tribal 
communities.113 
 One way to address concerns about discrimination against women 
has been to ensure that settler government documents impose gender 
equality. The Law Commission report from New Zealand has addressed 
the gender issue directly suggesting that, while the right to decide 
membership is to be respected, gender discrimination in the waka umanga 
should not be permitted.114 In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1982 states 
that Aboriginal and treaty rights are ‘guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons’.115 Another way to address the concern is to ensure that, 
in any transitional period toward new structures or new initiatives, the 
interests of women are taken into account in the process. The Royal 
                                                 
110  J Silman, Enough is Enough: Aboriginal Women Speak Out (The Women’s 
Press, 1987) for interviews with the women who led the fight. Although the 
amendments to the Indian Act allowed women who lost their status to be 
reinstated, there is still discrimination against women built into the new scheme: 
Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 4, 37-53. For a general commentary 
from a Mohawk perspective, see P Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A 
Mohawk Woman Speaks (Fernwood Publishing, 1995).  
111  Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978). 
112  Wunder, above n 106, 153-56. 
113  For a summary of critiques of this decision from the perspectives of women, see 
Getches, et al, above n 31, 399-405. 
114  Waka Umanga, above n 98, para 4.53. 
115  Constitution Act 1982, s 35(4). 
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Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommends that all nations ‘ensure 
that the participation of women in the creation and design of justice 
systems is both meaningful and significant’116  
 In the end, we must realize that establishing abstract legal 
standards or creating inclusive processes do not, by themselves, ensure the 
protection of women. There must be a meaningful way, on the ground, to 
implement solutions that are effective. The opening story in this chapter 
showed how a conflict between the federal and provincial government 
stymied attempts by the community to control alcohol abuse. In the United 
States, a jurisdictional conflict affects women who experience domestic 
violence on tribal lands. Statistics reveal that Indian women experience 
very high rates of spousal abuse – 39 per cent have been victims. Non-
Indian men commit 75 per cent of the abuses. As we have mentioned, 
Indian tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians, so they are 
left powerless. The federal government, which does have jurisdiction, has 
not committed funds to enforce federal laws on Indian reserves. Only 30 
per cent of all federal crimes on tribal land were prosecuted by federal 
attorneys and within that number, domestic assaults are a low priority. 
Rebecca Hart and Alexander Lowther argue that the solution lies in 
placing greater authority in the hands of the tribes: ‘[t]ribal remedies not 
only bolster the sovereignty of tribes, they aid Native American women in 
reclaiming self-determination over their bodies’.117 
  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed a number of forms of governance that 
could result from the exercise of self-determination. Outright 
independence apart, the form that gives the greatest autonomy from the 
settler government is the United States model where courts have 
recognized tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’. Under the doctrine of 
                                                 
116  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Canada Communications 
Group, 1996) 275. 
117  RA Hart and MA Lowther, ‘Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to 
Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence’ (2008) 96 California 
Law Review 185. 
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retained sovereignty, tribes generally have power to make laws in all areas 
until they have been overridden by an Act of Congress. In Canada, the 
recently negotiated self-government agreements, such as the Nisga’a 
Agreement recognize that First Nations have an inherent right of self-
government. Although the scope of Nisga’a powers is more limited than 
the powers of tribes in the United States, the laws that the Nisga’a can 
make in relation to some matters are paramount over federal and 
provincial laws. Unlike in the United States, the Nisga’a law making 
authority is constitutionally protected so that unilateral federal legislation 
cannot take away those powers. 
 Self-administration and self-management models are found in all 
four jurisdictions. Indigenous nations receive delegated responsibilities 
from federal or state governments to administer services to their 
constituents. The most advanced form of this model is found in Canada 
under the Indian Act. Indian Bands have reserves set aside and some 
power to make local by-laws. Land settlements in Australia and New 
Zealand have given limited by-law making authority to Indigenous bodies. 
Where there is no land base, the most elaborate model was the Aboriginal 
and Torres Straight Island Commission in Australia, which had nationally 
elected Aboriginal representatives on its board, and its mandate included 
advocating for the interests of the Indigenous people. This model for 
service delivery has advantages, especially for Indigenous people living in 
urban areas. However, it has been criticized for being too dependent on 
non- Indigenous design and implementation, to be entirely satisfactory.  
 Ownership and control of lands and resources is crucial to the 
survival of Indigenous peoples. Some Indigenous communities and nations 
do own some resources, especially where there is a recognized land base. 
But ownership is not the only issue. Indigenous control and participation 
in the stewardship of the resource is also important, and this is most often 
accomplished through co-management or joint management structures.  
 Finally, we have reviewed variations on participation in public 
government. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the reserved seats for Māori have 
been a feature of their legislature since 1867. Recently, Inuit of Nunavut 
have opted for a public government model combined with reserved rights 
set out in a land claims agreement for Inuit. Institutions similar to Sami 
Parliaments in Scandinavia have not picked up many adherents in the four 
countries studied in this reader.  
It is difficult, in the abstract, to judge which is the ‘best’ model. 
They all have limitations and advantages for certain constituents. It is 
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important to note, however, that a judgment cannot be made simply on 
whether the institutions or activities ¨look Indigenous¨. Indigeneity, like 
non-indigeneity, changes over time. To understand a society, it is not 
appropriate to take a snapshot that freezes relationships and movement at a 
particular moment in history. It is more appropriate to think of a video 
camera that captures shifting patterns, motion, and temporal texture. 
Indigenous people interacting with the non- Indigenous world are 
constantly defining Indigeneity, so it is difficult to ‘fix’ on a particular set 
of characteristics.  
 Rather than focusing on outward appearances, it may be more useful 
to think of criteria that reflect the dynamic nature of Indigenous 
communities and their relationship with the state. I believe that there are at 
least three factors to consider in the evaluation of particular choices for 
self-determination. The first would be to determine the degree to which 
the Indigenous group participated and consented to the arrangement. I 
have indicated that wide participation at a community level, including the 
active participation of women in the decision-making process is crucial to 
success. Second, the arrangement could be judged on the degree to which 
the Indigenous people have autonomy to conceptualize, design and 
implement their priorities. For example, laws that may work perfectly well 
within the mainstream society may not be appropriate in the Indigenous 
context. Third, the initiatives adopted should ensure transparency and 
accountability within the Indigenous community. This will require a 
careful balancing between respecting the autonomy of the Indigenous 
collectivity and ensuring that individuals within that collectivity are 
treated equitably. To continue the development of Indigenous self- 
determination, then, would involve increased participation, increased 
autonomy and increased Indigenous government accountability.  
The road ahead is not clear by any means. While there have been 
some advances in government policies through court decisions, there have 
also been significant setbacks. In Australia, the recommendation for a 
national treaty was rejected by the government of the day and the only 
nationally elected representative organization for Indigenous people, the 
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission, was disbanded in 
2005. In Canada, there has been very little follow up by governments on 
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.118 
                                                 
118  Assembly of First Nations (AFN), Royal Commission on Aboriginal People at 
Ten Years: A Report Card (AFN, no date); D Stack, ‘Making Aboriginal Policy: 
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New Zealand enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 to vest title in 
the Crown in order to overturn a court decision that had looked favourably 
on Māori interests.119 The US Supreme Court has backtracked on 
sovereignty rights and has severely curtailed jurisdiction of tribes over 
non-Indians.120 On the international front, it is important to note that the 
only four countries to vote against the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 were 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. 
 History so far has taught us two things. First, Indigenous people are 
not going to disappear. Second, the assimilation policies have been a 
dismal failure. Studies, such as that of Chandler that relate self-
determination to lower suicide rates, and that of the Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development, that relate self-determination to 
greater economic stability, should impel governments to recognize that 
self-determination for Indigenous peoples is the only viable policy for the 
years ahead.  
 
                                                                                                                         
A Conference Ten Years After the Final Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples The First Decade of RCAP's Influence on Aboriginal Law’ 
(2007) 70 Saskatchewan Law Review 123.  
119  See the chapter in this book by Jacinta Ruru. 
120  See the chapter in this book by Benjamin J Richardson. 
